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Abstract 
Reaching an optimal capital structure is a goal for every business. In order to reach that 
goal, companies issue debt. The aim of this study is to examine whether tangibility, R&D 
expenditure, market value and the presence of financial experts on boards of directors in-
fluence firm’s leverage. The analysis was performed on Finnish listed companies between 
the years 2013-2016 based on firm-level secondary data. The main objective was to deter-
mine whether the corporate capital structure is affected by the aforementioned determi-
nants.  
Theoretical and empirical literature was collected from diverse literature including corpo-
rate reports, academic journals and research articles. Secondary data was collected from 
official databases and company’s financial statements. SPSS software performed both the 
descriptive, correlational and regression analyses using the data in order to identify causal 
relationships between the variables.  
The results revealed that tangible assets support both short- and long-term debt, as sup-
ported by prior studies. R&D expenditure has been long known to support long-term debt, 
and the results of this study supported that claim. On the other hand, R&D expenditure is 
known not to be as an ideal determinant of short-term debt, and the results support this 
conclusion. 
Furthermore, the results have indicated that large corporations have fairly easy access to 
both short- and long-term debt, as supported by prior studies. Lastly, the presence of fi-
nancial experts on boards of directors revealed not to be a determinant of both short- and 
long-term debt. This result is opposed to prior studies that have shown that financial ex-
perts significantly affect the finance and investment policies. 
 Keywords/tags (subjects)  
Firm market value, capital structure, debt financing, leverage, tangible assets, intangible 
assets, financial experts on boards of directors, short- and long-term debt. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Background 
Capital structure is the composition of a firm’s liabilities. Brealey, Myers, & Allen 
(2011, 4) define capital structure as the choice between debt and equity financing. 
Every organizaion has the possibility to compose their own debt to equity ratio that 
suits their preferences, such as their tolerance towards debt. Large corporations 
have plenty of debt possibilities. They can for example borrow from a bank or by 
issuing equity, or borrow in different currencies. Also they can decide whether they 
prefer short-term debt or long-term debt (ibid.). Capital structure is often 
determined by two theories – The Pecking Order theory and the Trade-off theory 
(Bartholdy, & Mateus, 2008, 2). In the Pecking Order theory, firms choose the 
cheapest funding source and when exhausted move to the next cheapest funding 
source until they end up with external equity. The Trade-off theory is used to explain 
the decision between debt and equity financing. It is based on the assumption that 
debt financing should be used due to the tax benefits generated by it, until the 
optimal capital structure is reached (ibid).  
The financial crisis of 2008 had an enormous impact on the global economy. The 
result of the crisis resulted in extra precautions by lenders, which affected directly on 
firms’ capital structure (Foster, & Magdoff 2008, 11). Further research on this subject 
is important in order to gain a deeper understanding of the current capital structure. 
This thesis aims to present the current determinants of short- and long-term debt of 
Finnish non-financial listed firms, by focusing on four main determinants – tangibility, 
R&D expenditure, market value and the presence of financial experts on boards of 
directors.  
After reviewing a variety of empirical and theoretical literature, the relevant 
hypotheses were formed. The most important ones being that tangibility supports 
both short- and long-term debt, R&D expenditure supports only long-term debt, 
market value supports both short- and long-term debt and the presence of financial 
experts on boards of directors does influence on the procurement of debt 
favourably. The hypotheses were tested by analysing the data collected from Nasdaq 
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Nordic Stock Exchange OMXH25 firms. There were applied descriptive and inferential 
analyses in order to develop a better understanding of the association of short- and 
long-term debt and tangibility, R&D expenditure, market value and the presence of 
financial experts on boards of directors. 
The analyses showed a clear association between tangibility and both short- and 
long-term debt. The results of tangibility supporting debt matches with the 
predetermined hypothesis. R&D expenditure, which is already known for supporting 
long-term debt, does support long-term debt. On the other hand, R&D expenditure is 
known not to be as an ideal determinant of short-term debt, resulting with another 
matching hypothesis. In addition, the third hypothesis was accepted, resulting with 
positive association between market value and both short- and long-term debt. 
Lastly, the analysis of the presence of financial experts on boards of directors found 
that there is no association between the two variables, resulting with a rejected 
hypothesis.  
1.2 Motivation for the research 
The author’s motivation for this research was formed by a great interest in the field 
of finance in general and the capital structure topic in particular. Since the author 
wishes to pursue a career in the financial industry, it was inevitable to pick a topic in 
the field of finance that would further develop the understanding within the field. In 
addition to the personal motivation, the field may also be contributed by this paper. 
Capital structure plays a key role in every major corporation, and the importance of it 
for every organization is immense. Even though there have been numerous re-
searches concerning capital structure, it is vitally important to examine the capital 
structure of current times, and to learn whether there have been changes caused by 
the latest financial crisis. Moreover, most studies concerning capital structure have 
been done outside of Finland, and as rules and regulations in different countries vary 
greatly, the relevance of this research is even more significant. 
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1.3 Research questions 
An extensive literature on the determinants of debt has been generated in recent 
years. However, not much research has been done in the same area focusing on 
Finnish firms. This led to the formation of four research questions: 
1. Do the tangible assets impact firms’ debt (both, short- and long-term)?  
2. Does the R&D expenditure impact firms’ debt (both, short- and long-term)? 
3. Does the market value impact firms’ debt (both, short- and long-term)?  
4. Does the presence of financial experts on the boards of directors influence 
the procurement of debt favourably?  
 
In order to answer the aforementioned questions, 23 non-financial, publicly-traded 
firms on Nasdaq Nordic Stock Exchange (OMXH25) were chosen and explored. This 
study examines the determinants of short- and long-term debt. Therefore, the rela-
tionships of tangibility, R&D expenditure, market value and the presence of financial 
experts on boards of directors are discussed in depth. The secondary data was col-
lected from the corporate annual reports between the years 2013-2016, and other 
financial sources, such as Bloomberg and Reuters. The key variables were analysed 
by using correlation and regression analyses with the help of SPSS statistics software. 
1.4 Structure of the thesis 
The remainder of this thesis consists of four main chapters. In the second chapter, 
“Theoretical Framework and Literature Review”, the empirical research of previous 
studies, as well as, the theoretical background by discussing in detail the key con-
cepts concerning this research are being presented. This chapter helps forming the 
foundation for the creation of the hypotheses. The third chapter, “Methodology”, 
describes the research approach and the data analysis method used to collect and 
analyze data. The fourth chapter, “Research Results”, presents the findings of the 
analysis performed on the data. These findings are divided into three parts – descrip-
tive statistics, correlation analysis and regression analysis. The fifth and final chapter, 
“Discussion and Conclusions”, elaborates on the research questions’ results in addi-
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tion to comparing them with their hypotheses. Furthermore, it discusses the implica-
tions and limitations of the research as well as the recommendations for future re-
search. 
2 Theoretical Framework and Literature Review of Leverage 
In order to understand why firms use debt to finance their operations, it is utmost 
important to understand how the capital structure is composed. On one side there is 
the shareholders’ equity (net worth) and, on the other, there are the liabilities (debt). 
If a firm is looking for expansion or facing financial difficulties, they might be looking 
for additional capital that comes in a form of debt to finance their activities. 
The next subchapters present empirical and theoretical literature about corporate 
debt in today’s economy, and the determinants affecting the likelihood of a firm 
issuing debt will be reviewed and explained in the following order: tangible assets, 
intangible assets, firm market value, and financial experts on boards of directors.  
2.1 Corporate debt in today’s economy 
A firm’s capital is composed of internal financing (revenue) and external financing 
(leverage). Myers (1984, 581) states that according to the Pecking Order theory, 
firms will use their retained earnings first (internal financing), only when that is 
depleted debt (external financing) is issued and when it is no longer sensible to issue 
additional debt, equity is issued. Based on the Pecking Order theory, firms are 
reluctant to take debt due to its risk, nor willing to sell their ownership stakes, and 
prefer using their own revenues in order to finance their operations. However, there 
are several other factors influencing greater usage of leverage, for example, a firm’s 
life cycle. In the expansion stage, firms often experience rapid growth and are 
looking to enter new markets, therefore, they are in need for external financing. 
Also, as larger and more diversified firms face lower default risk, lenders may offer 
deals with favoring conditions, which might persuade the aforementioned firms 
issuing additional debt. Furthermore, to which industry they belong may affect on 
different usage levels of leverage (Frank, & Goyal, 2004, 9-13). Bradley, Jarrell, & Kim 
(1984, 876) have made tests presenting industry differences in leverage ratios. They 
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have found that there is a strong industry influence on firms’ leverage ratios. The 
following figure clearly presents that financial services and automotive industry 
prefer issuing more debt. 
 
 
Figure 1 - Do all companies use leverage? (Yglesias, 2014) 
 
Debt to equity ratio is a well-known method to measure a firm’s financial leverage. It 
is calculated by dividing a firm’s total liabilities by its stockholder’s equity (The 
Economic Times, 2018). The D/E ratio indicates the financing that comes from 
creditors and investors as a percentage of its equity (Oxford Reference, 2018a). A 
debt to equity ratio greater than 1, indicates that a firm uses more creditor financing 
(debt) than investor financing (shareholder’s equity). 
   
Figure 2 - Formula of debt to equity ratio (Wikiaccounting, 2018) 
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Brealey, Myers, & Allen (2011, 465) state that an optimal capital structure is the 
optimal debt to equity ratio a firm can have in order to minimize its cost of capital 
and to maximize its market value. Frydenberg (2004, 25) claims that if a firm does 
not borrow, it wastes precious equity, and the only dilemma is how much every firm 
should borrow. According to Binsbergen, Graham, & Yang (2011, 31), we have come 
a long way towards a better understanding of why and how firms choose their capital 
structure up to the point we can determine the optimal capital structure based on 
the marginal cost and marginal benefit of optimal and or suboptimal debt for a given 
firm. Their research has found that when firms use the optimal capital structure, 
their average net benefit of debt is 4% of firm value and as high as 13% for some 
firms. They also found that the cost of using too much debt is higher than the cost of 
using too little debt, which may explain why firms use debt conservatively.  
Brealey, Myers, & Allen (2011, 597) state that there are numerous ways in which a 
firm can issue debt. A firm can issue bonds both in its home country or in another 
country, it can take mortgages on a real estate, or by taking traditional loans. Those 
loans may be collateral free or asset-backed securities. In case the loan is asset-
backed security, and the firm is facing a financial distress the lender may claim his 
collateral. The most common collaterals are account receivables, real estates and 
lease payments (ibid. 597-602).    
The debt vs. equity financing dilemma is one faced by many business owners looking 
for capital to expand their business. Debt financing includes short- and long-term 
credit a business receives from a lender. Kunigis (2017) provides a list of benefits and 
drawbacks associating with debt financing. 
Benefits of debt financing: 
 Maintain ownership: Although the firm is obligated the agreed-upon pay-
ments on time to the lender, they are able to retain the right to run the busi-
ness however they wish without external interference. 
 Tax deduction: Any interest paid on borrowed money for business activities is 
tax deductible. 
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 Lower interest rates: Firms with excellent credit rating may get only 10% in-
terest rate on their debt, whereas, at the same time Government tax may be 
at 30% tax rate. 
 Easier budget planning: When firms know exactly how much and when they 
are required to pay, it makes it easier to create a budget and make financial 
plans. 
Drawbacks of debt financing: 
 Qualification requirements: Firms with poor credit score might not be able to 
find a lender willing to borrow them money. 
 Costs of debt: a Firm is required to pay an effective tax rate, which might not 
be favorable.  
 Repayment: Even if a business fails, it still requires repaying its debt to the 
lender unless declared bankruptcy. 
 Collateral: By agreeing to provide collateral to the lender, a firm puts its busi-
ness assets at risk. At times, the shareholders are required to sign a loan guar-
antee for a portion or all of the debt. 
 Impact on credit rating: It might seem attractive to keep “levering up”, but 
each loan is noted in a credit report and will affect the credit score because 
the more a firm borrows the riskier it becomes to the lender and the subse-
quent loan will demand a higher interest rate. 
Terms of Debt 
Debt maturity refers to the final payment date that the debtor requires to repay its 
loan or other financial instrument including all interests in full (Oxford Reference, 
2018b). When a debt matures, the contract between the two parties ends. However, 
some fixed-income securities are “callable”, which means that the debtor is able to 
repay its debt at any time before the debt matures. 
Debt is classified into two terms, short- and long-term debt. Short-term debt repre-
sents any financial obligations that are due within one year. Short-term debt pre-
sented in a firm’s balance sheet under “Current liabilities” (Nasdaq, 2017a). Long-
term debt consists of loans and financial obligations that are to be matured in a 
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greater than one year period. Long-term debt is presented in a firm’s balance sheet 
under “non-current liabilities” (Nasdaq, 2017b). 
There are real evidences of the importance of short-term lending in recent years. 
Custódio et al. (2012, 1) have found that over the last three decades, there is a trend 
across firms to issue more short-term debt. There are several reasons for this im-
mense growth of short-term lending. Short-term debt mature every year, which gives 
lenders their funds back for additional lending. Also, these debts are often in sub-
stantial lower sums than long-term lending usually are, what makes them more avail-
able for firms seeking for additional funds. Another reason to why we have experi-
enced such a great level of growth in recent years is because it is easier for firms to 
qualify for short-term loans. The documentation requirement has gone looser, busi-
ness owners can only provide several bank statements with additional of minimal pa-
perwork (Wood, 2017). Firms often issue short-term debt in order to cover inventory 
costs and are often tied to growth and expansion (Brealey, Myers, & Allen, 2011, 
352, Kumar et al. 2012), whereas firms issuing long-term debt are often tied financ-
ing long-lived assets such as plant and machinery (Brealey, Myers, & Allen, 2011, 
733). 
Long-term debt has distinct characteristics to why firms prefer issuing it. Firms using 
collateral to secure their long-term debt are often getting preferable lower interest 
rates (Benmelech, 2009, 1581). Furthermore, Long-term loans tend to be more sta-
ble. The agreed upon payment method is being applied with normal stability over the 
course of the loan, and the timing of payments and the interest rate level usually re-
main constant over the life span of loan repayment (Chron, 2017). 
Fan, Twite, & Titman (2010, 2) have found that a country legal taxation system, level 
of corruption and the preference of capital suppliers explains to a large extent the 
variation in leverage and debt maturities. Their results shows high correlation be-
tween countries that viewed as more corrupt tend to take more debt in general and 
issue more short-term debt in particular. Similarly, there is also a high correlation be-
tween countries with more common laws to be less levered and to issue more long-
term debt. They also found that suppliers of capital may control how firms are fi-
nanced. There is a high correlation in countries with larger banking sector to shorter 
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debt maturities. In addition, the existence of bankruptcy is well associated with 
higher debt ratios and a greater use of long-term debt. 
Shareholder’s Equity 
It was previously mentioned that the capital structure is composed of both external 
and internal financing. For the latter one, there are two ways for raising equity fi-
nancing. Firstly, in case the firm is not a publicly-traded firm, they can sell a fraction 
of the firm’s ownership to the public and use the additional capital as they wish. Fur-
thermore, in case the firm is already publicly-traded, they can issue new shares of 
stock. Secondly, equity financing is possible by taking the cash flow generated by ex-
isting assets and reinvest the cash in new assets (Brealey, Myers, & Allen, 2011, 4). 
According to the Pecking Order theory, issuing equity should be the firm’s last resort. 
2.2 Tangible assets 
Tangible asset defined as any asset that has a physical form with clear purchase value 
(Oxford Reference 2018c). Tangible assets are composed of current and fixed assets. 
Current assets (also known as liquid assets) in addition to cash, are items in which a 
business expects to gain profit from by the end of the financial year, for example in-
ventory (business dictionary, 2018a). Fixed assets are physical items that cannot be 
sold easily at any point. Such items may be considered long-term investment or due 
to their day-to-day use, examples of fixed assets are machinery, property and land 
(business dictionary, 2018b). 
Countless large corporations seek for debt in order to finance additional projects and 
innovations. Financial institutions, which in most cases are the lenders wish to mini-
mize their risk by pledging a collateral to protect themselves in case the borrower is 
unable to repay its debt. Many prior studies have found a positive correlation be-
tween tangibility and leverage. Tangible assets (both current and fixed assets) pro-
vide a useful channel of borrowing in firms that can pledge their tangible assets as 
collateral (Almeida, & Campello, 2007, 2-3, Lim, Macias, & Moeller, 2014, 3-4). These 
studies show that tangible assets support more borrowing, which may allow for addi-
tional investment using tangible assets as collateral. 
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Tangible assets tend to be less risky and easier to value than intangible assets. There-
fore, borrowing costs should be relatively lower when tangible assets serve as collat-
eral for the firms’ debt (Lim, Macias, & Moeller, 2014, 3-4). Common sense suits well 
with their theory. In case of insolvency of the borrower, the lender may claim the 
tangible assets (collateral) and to recover at least some value that otherwise would 
have been lost.  
There are several advantages for having tangible assets. Large amount of tangible as-
sets affects the credit status of a firm. Businesses with more tangible assets may 
have greater access to external funds (both short- and long-term) (Almeida, & Cam-
pello, 2007, 29). Another advantage of having ample amount of tangible assets is in 
case of financial distress. Tangible assets can always be liquidated and turned into 
cash. However, tangible assets are not immune to depreciation. Nearly all tangible 
assets can be depreciated and lose value, therefore, tangible assets serving as collat-
eral for short- or long-term debt are definitely not risk free (Investopedia 2017a). 
2.3 Intangible assets 
Intangible assets defined as assets that can neither be seen nor touched. They vary 
between patents, brand names, trademarks, copyrights, research and development, 
goodwill, etc. (Oxford Reference, 2018d). In recent years, Intangible assets are taking 
a bigger share of value. According to Ocean Tomo (2015), at the year of 1975, intan-
gible assets represented only 17% of S&P 500 value, only 40 years later its share un-
dergone an astonishing rise up to 87% (see figure). 
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Figure 3 - Components of S&P 500 Market Value (Ocean Tomo, 2015) 
Characteristics and difficulties for firms with intangible assets: 
Although firms with intangible assets are diverse, clearly they share their own char-
acteristics. In the next bullet points the characteristics and difficulties are elaborated 
and explained. 
 Association between intangible assets and debt 
It is well known that firms with more tangible assets tend to have more debt. The 
main reason for that phenomenon is that tangible assets may serve as safer collat-
eral than intangible assets often are. Another reason why tangible assets support 
more debt than intangible assets is because they tend to be less risky and easier to 
value.  
According to Lim, Macias, & Moeller (2014, 20-21), firms with insufficient amount of 
tangible assets may also support debt well. A study conducted by them has shown to 
what extent intangible assets support debt. According to their research, “on average, 
one dollar of intangible assets supports approximately three quarters as much debt 
as one dollar of tangible assets”. Their study’s results suggest that intangible assets 
supports debt well because they support the repayment of debt, and that some in-
tangible assets can potentially serve as collateral. We may also learn from their re-
sults that the ratio of a firm tangible to intangible assets is associated with the firms’ 
types of debt. Firms with fewer tangible assets tend to be riskier borrowers. Corre-
spondingly, these firms tend to have debt with more protecting features for lenders, 
such as short maturities, more term loans, more convertible debt, less fixed-rate 
debt, etc. Their results fit well with the general assumption that tangible assets sup-
port debt better than intangible assets do. However, when firms do not own an 
abundance of tangible assets, intangible assets supports debt almost as well as tangi-
ble assets do. 
 Valuation difficulties 
It has long been recognized that intangible assets expenses are facing great valuation 
difficulties. The problem lies in the accounting rules to distinguish between the two 
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types of intangible assets: The ones that are acquired externally, through transac-
tions such as mergers and acquisitions, and the others that are self-created internally 
such as R&D, marketing expenses, etc. (Damodaran, 2010, 4). Self-created intangible 
assets are not reflected in financial statements, instead, they are incorporated into 
general operating expenses. When such intangible assets are not presented in the fi-
nancial statements, firms’ market value appears smaller than it is actually is (ibid.). 
Another problem that arises by intangible assets valuation is that it is extremely diffi-
cult to fairly assess their true value. Researches usually cannot observe the book 
value of Intangible assets such Apple’s iOS and macOS, Microsoft’s Windows and Of-
fice software and Coca Cola’s Brand name, not to mention market or fair values. The 
results are that researchers provide sporadic estimations that at times might cause a 
great increase or a decrease to a firms’ true value (Lim, Macias, & Moeller 2014, 2). 
 Equity options 
Although both tangible and intangible asset oriented firms use equity options as part 
of their management compensation, the general perception is that intangible asset 
oriented firms tend to compensate its employees much more in such manner (Damo-
daran, 2010, 5). One might argue that it might be attributed by the location of firms 
in the life cycle. Often Intangible asset oriented firms are in their growth stage, (for 
example, high-tech companies), and they are unable to compensate in other ways. 
However, the reason to why intangible asset oriented firms tend to compensate its 
employees with equity options may be related to how dependent these firms are in 
retaining human capital. 
2.4 Firm market value 
Market value, also referred to as market capitalization is the total market value a 
firm is worth. It is calculated by multiplying the number of its outstanding shares by 
the current market price of a firm’s shares (Nasdaq, 2017c). The valuation of a pri-
vate firm is significantly more complicated than a publicly-traded firm. In order to de-
termine firm market value of privately-owned company, it is needed to conduct sev-
eral major estimations that an individual investor may be unable to conduct without 
some access to relevant financial information of the privately-owned company (Dam-
odaran, n.d.). For those with the access to the aforementioned information, it is 
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much simpler to evaluate the firm’s market value. For such evaluation the discount 
rate estimations and the total beta estimation are needed, together with an estima-
tion of the cost of debt and capital of that given firm (ibid.). In real estate for exam-
ple, each piece of real estate is unique, therefore, the best approximation of market 
value is to compare recent sales of similar properties (Investopedia, 2018a). As Fidel-
ity (2017) explains, market value as a concept is extremely important because it al-
lows investors to differentiate the relative size of a business in a comparison to any 
other business. Market value measures the company’s real value on the open mar-
ket, in addition to the market’s perception of its future prospects because it reflects 
what investors are willing to pay for its stock. 
Market value is differentiated by its size. While there is no one set framework to de-
fine each size, the following table concludes a widely used framework agreed by 
many (Investopedia, 2017b). 
Table 1 - Market cap sizes (Source: author) 
Firms with high market value may enjoy certain advantages due to their large size. 
For example, the stock price of such firms tends to be less volatile than smaller mar-
ket value firms because their products and services are proven on a national and or 
international scale and are likely to continue being sold in times of recession (Chron, 
2017). From the investor’s perspective, firms with higher market value can be more 
attractive than smaller market value firms because they tend to be more stable and 
to offer generous periodic dividends. However, large market value firms also face 
limitations. Firms at this magnitude are often well-established and expanded, there-
fore, they tend to have lower growth potential than smaller firms. Having higher 
Market cap category Market cap $ Firms from OMXH25 
used in the research 
Mega-cap  $200B+  
Large-cap  $10B – $200B 8 
Mid-cap $2B - $10B 13 
Small-cap $300M – $2B 2 
Micro-cap $50M - $300M  
Nano-cap $0M - $50M  
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growth potential can be attractive to investors because they offer the potential for 
big gains in a relatively short period of time (ibid.). 
Even though there are intangible asset oriented companies, often companies with 
very high market value tend to own a substantial amount of tangible and intangible 
assets as well. As previously mentioned, tangible assets may serve as collateral for 
firms seeking for credit. Financial institutions may feel more secure lending money to 
firms with such large market value since they are more likely to be able to repay their 
debts on time. In case these companies are in a financial distress, their large amount 
of tangible and intangible assets may reduce the lender’s loss (Lim, Macias, & 
Moeller, 2014, 5). As for individual investors, companies with high market value tend 
to be less risky borrowers because they are less volatile to price fluctuation and re-
cession, what makes them a safer investment for individual investors (Morningstar, 
2017). 
2.5 Financial experts on boards of directors 
A board of directors is a group of appointed or elected to represent the shareholders 
of for-profit, non-profit and Government agency organizations (Brealey, Myers, & Al-
len, 2011, 14). Boards of directors establish administrative policies such as hiring and 
firing of executives, distribution of dividends and executives’ compensation, as well 
as protecting interests of the administration. The boards also make decisions on be-
half of shareholders, in order to protect their own investments on the company 
(ibid.). 
The boards of directors are composed of experts of various fields, some are financial 
experts. It is expected of financial experts to lead the firm towards an optimal capital 
structure. In order to reach that goal, firms need to have the right proportion of debt 
to equity. Financial experts may be able to use their reputation and connections to 
assist in the procurement of issuing additional debt with favorable conditions. Güner, 
Malmendier, & Tate (2006, 29-30) have found that when commercial bankers join 
boards, external funding increases and investment cash flow sensitivity decreases. 
Their research results support the assumption that the presence of financial experts 
on the boards of directors influences the procurement of debt favorably. 
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When it comes to board of directors, there are several factors that may influence 
their performance. In the next sub-chapters these factors are elaborated and ex-
plained.  
2.5.1  Association between agency theory and debt 
Agent is a person that acts on behalf of another person or a group (Business Diction-
ary, 2018c). Agency theory is concerned with resolving conflicts that develop among 
the stockholders, bondholders and the managers (Nasdaq, 2018d). In case of pub-
licly-traded corporations, the board of directors (agent) are making decisions on be-
half of shareholders (principals) and the board of directors (principal) oversees deci-
sions taken by the acting management (agent). 
Boards of directors may experience the agency theory very often. There are two 
problems that agency theory often addresses. The first type of conflict is between 
the acting management and the board of directors. Such agency problems may arise 
between these two parties due to management members’ self-interest to seek for 
promotion, or by poor monitoring actions by the boards that may lead to lower qual-
ity of the financial reporting (Hundal, 2016, 342). The second type of conflict is be-
tween the shareholders and the board of directors. Such agency problems may arise 
between these two parties due to different tolerances towards risk (Investopedia, 
2018b). These types of conflicts may occur when the board is willing to take a bigger 
risk than the shareholder truly wish to. Another problem that may occur between 
the shareholders and the board of directors is due to conflict of interests. There 
might be a board member who is also a member of a competitor’s board. Such con-
flict of interest might lead to delay in decision making and by not acting in favor of 
the firm (Armour et al. 2009, 2). 
Agency problems may affect financial experts in decisions relating to financing of as-
sets. Problems as such may occur when the shareholders are not willing to issue ad-
ditional debt, whereas, the financial experts are willing to exploit the additional 
funds and enjoy the tax benefits that comes along. On the contrary, it may be times 
when the financial experts do not support issuing additional debt due to their 
knowledge of the optimal capital structure, whereas, the shareholders are the ones 
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who are pushing for issuing additional debt. Agency problems may cause that finan-
cial experts do not manage to truly influence the capital structure. 
2.5.2  Composition of the board of directors 
Efficient board of directors is a crucial tool for a company to build its performance, 
create reputation, as well as to monitor the executive directors and to provide re-
sources for the company such as access to debt (Hillman, & Dalziel, 2003 387-388).  
With that being said, the board composition becomes even more vital for an organi-
zation success. In order to understand how shareholders decide on the board’s com-
position, it is important to take into account in which kind of development stage the 
company is at the moment of the board’s composition.  
According Hillman, Golden, & Lynall (2003, 416), the timing of the formation of the 
boards affects greatly on its performance. At what point of organizational life cycle 
the board formed often defines the board’s probabilities to succeed. Quinn, & Cam-
eron (1983, 35) find four distinct stages of life cycle that each of them affects differ-
ently on the composition of the board. The first is the entrepreneurial stage. At this 
stage, companies conduct early innovation and formatting their niche. The second is 
the growth stage. At this stage, companies generate a consistent source of income. 
The third is the expansion stage. At this stage, companies often experience rapid 
growth in both revenues and in cash flows and are looking to expand to new mar-
kets. The fourth is maturity and decentralization stage. At this stage, companies ei-
ther look to remain stable or to exit some markets (ibid.). In entrepreneurial stage, 
shareholders are more likely to assign more sales and innovation oriented directors, 
whereas, in maturity and decentralization stage, shareholders are more likely to as-
sign directors with greater knowledge in mergers and acquisition and in organiza-
tional structure. However, over time firms resign and assign new board members in 
order to create a balance of expertise amongst the board members. 
Boards of directors are not composed only according to individual expertise, but also 
according to their connections to the firm. Boards of directors are composed of in-
side and outside directors. Inside directors are directors who are also employed in 
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the company (Brealey, Myers, & Allen, 2011, G-1), whereas, outside directors are di-
rectors who are not employed nor being a stakeholder of the company (Cambridge 
Dictionary, 2018).  
A board consisting of large majority of outside directors is an independent board. 
There are many advantages of an independent board. For example, differently than 
inside directors, outside directors do not have an interest of getting promoted, and 
therefore will provide vigilant oversight over the firm’s executives (Financial Times, 
2017).  Based on speculations, one might assume that a firm’s value decreases when 
the fraction of insiders on the board increases. However, there are several argu-
ments against that claim. Coles, Daniel, & Naveen (2005, 3) have found that R&D in-
tensive firms may derive greater value from having a larger fraction of inside direc-
tors because they possess more firm specific knowledge. Baysinger, Kosnik, & Turk 
(1991, 212) have found that boards with greater representation of inside directors 
increases R&D spending. Baysinger, & Hoskisson (1990, 74) claim that inside direc-
tors can be better at selecting an appropriate strategy due to their in-depth 
knowledge of the firm.  
Financial experts on boards of directors may be inside or outside directors. Similarly 
with Baysinger, & Hoskisson claim, financial experts who are inside directors may 
have an edge over financial experts who are outside directors of the same firm be-
cause they may have greater knowledge of the firm. However, inside directors may 
act irrationally due to their self-interest for seeking a promotion. Financial experts 
who are outside directors may have greater financial experience and connections to 
benefit the firm. However, some financial experts who are outside directors may suf-
fer from excessive workload, resulting in poor work performance for either firm. 
2.5.3  Board size 
Across firms and industries, there are different sizes of boards of directors. Much of 
prior literature suggests that smaller boards are more successful. The arguments are 
based on that the smaller boards are more cohesive, more productive, and can moni-
tor a firm more efficiently, whereas, larger boards may be less effective due to coor-
dination problems and problems such as free-riding (Jansen, 1993, 865, Lipton, & 
Lorsch, 1992, 67-68, , Coles, Daniel, & Naveen, 2005, 6). Lipton, & Lorsch (1992, 67-
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68) argue that boards with 8 or 9 members are the most effective. They believe so 
because in bigger boards, it becomes in harder for every member to express their 
ideas and opinions inside the limited time available at board meetings.  
Furthermore, Hundal (2017, 156) has found that when directors are members in a 
large number of boards, they may suffer from “busyness”. Such problem may arise to 
both inside and outside directors. For inside directors, it may affect by not spending 
sufficient time in their firm, which may lead to underperformance in their day-to-day 
managerial tasks and not gaining enough firm-specific experience and knowledge 
that might affect to poor monitoring actions. (Dalton et al. 2003 20-21). For outside 
directors, it may affect by not being able to effectively monitor managerial actions 
(Jackling, & Johl, 2009, 497, Ferris et al. 2003, 1096-1097), and by conflict of interests 
by serving on boards of competitors, which may lead to delays in decision making 
and by not acting in favor of the firm (Fich, & Shivdasni, 2006, 691, Armour et al. 
2009, 2). However, not all scholars believe smaller boards are better. Yermack (1996, 
209) has found a negative relation between Tobin’s Q (total market value / total as-
set value) and board size for 452 large U.S. industrial corporations between 1984 and 
1991. This means that according to the research, these firms’ market value was un-
dervalued, which might imply that often smaller boards fail to create the firm’s value 
as it is truly valued.  
There has been numerous studies about the advisory role of the board. Rose, & 
Shephard (1997, 511) claim that diversified firms are more complex, and therefore 
require bigger boards of directors. Klein (1998, 8) argues that complex organizations 
require for more advisory to CEOs. Both Pfeffer (1972, 223) and Booth, & Deli (1996, 
87-88), argue that larger firms are more likely to have larger boards because they 
need more external contracting relations. For example a well-diversified firm such as 
General Electric, have a very large and diversified board (17 board members in De-
cember 2017). They vary between financial services, retail and automotive, paper 
and packaging, and truck leasing industries. 
The size of the boards of directors also effects on the amount of financial experts 
serving on boards. Firms often are seeking for experts from the same industry. For 
example, it is expected from UPM-Kymmene to have a fair representation of agricul-
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ture experts in their board, or from Nordea Bank to have a large representation of fi-
nancial experts on their board. Bigger boards of directors are able to compose both 
the industry experts and experts from different fields. Smaller boards often do not 
have a big representation of experts outside of their industry, therefore, the size of 
the boards clearly dictates the amount of financial experts on the board of directors. 
2.6 Hypotheses development 
Hypothesis is defined as an explanation about a specific phenomenon in order to 
construe and to provide a guidance for further investigation (Black, & Champion, 
1976, 126). In order that an hypothesis will be validated, it needs to be repeatedly 
tested. There are two possible outcomes out of hypothesis, proven and rejected 
hypothesis (Grinnell 1988, 200). Hence, the experiment aims to provide sufficient 
crediable data by the hypothesis testing (Hilborn, & Mangel 1997, 14-15). Kumar 
(2011, 83) states that an hypothesis is created in order to create an essence of the 
research and to increase the research objectivity. 
This paper aims to explore a total of six hypotheses with the assistance of descriptive 
and inferential analyses that were performed in order to either reject or to accept 
the hypotheses. 
Based on the literature review and empirical knowledge the following hypotheses 
have been formed: 
H1: Tangible assets do impact firms’ debt for both short- and long-term; 
H2: R&D expenditure does impact firms’ long-term debt but not the short-term debt; 
H3: Market value does impact firms’ debt for both short- and long-term; 
H4: The presence of financial experts on the boards of directors does influence the 
procurement of debt favourably; 
H5: Board size positively correlates to market value; 
H6: Total debt positively correlates to tangible to intangible assets. 
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3 Methodology 
This chapter presents the research design, followed by the data collection method 
and the definition of key variables, as well as the data analysis process and how it 
was implemented along with reliability and validity.  
3.1 Research design  
Saunders et al. (2009, 108) use the research “onion” framework in order to illustrate 
the various steps involved in the research process. The outer layer of the research 
“onion” is the research philosophies. The philosophy used in this research is 
positivism because it suits the thesis’s purpose, as explained next. Positivism 
describes the stance of a natural scientist (ibid. 2009, 113, Bryman, & Bell, 2015, 28), 
meaning that the phenomena observed by the researcher will lead to formation of 
credible data. In this research it is implemented by collecting financial information 
and then analyzing it to represent the findings. Moreover, existing evidences were 
used to develop the hypotheses. 
There are two main research approaches: deductive and inductive. The inductive ap-
proach involves the collection of data and the development of a theory as a result of 
the data analysis (Saunders et al. 2009, 124, Bernard, 2011, 7). This approach begins 
with observations, continues with the discovery of the patterns, and only then the 
theory is being made (Lodico, Spaulding, & Voegtle, 2010, 10). The deductive ap-
proach on the other hand, involves developing hypotheses or theories and then 
designing a research strategy to test them (Saunders et al. 2009, 124). This approach 
begins with a theory that leads the researcher to a new hypothesis that needs to be 
either confirmed or rejected. (Snieder, & Larner, 2013, 16). The deductive approach 
was chosen for this thesis since this research began with a theory, and only then the 
relevant methods were chosen and applied to test the hypotheses.  
The quantitative approach as defined by Creswell (2014, 4), is a systematic 
examination of a phenomenon using statistical techniques. In this study, the 
quantitative approach was considered as the most suitable approach since it 
examines the relationships among numeric variables. The quantitative approach has 
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several major advantages. For example, the statistical analysis provides greater 
objectivity when reviewing the results, therefore, more credible results often arise 
from this type of research. Another advantage is that numerical results may be 
displayed in graphs and charts which often allows for better interpretation (Center 
for Innovation, 2018).  
Saunders et al. (2009, 139) classify research purposes into three types: explanatory, 
exploratory, and descriptive. Explanatory research is conducted in order to define 
and characterize the cause and effect between variables. This research aims to 
determine whether the tangibility, R&D expenditure, market value and the presence 
of financial experts on boards of directors impact on firms’ short- and long-term 
debt. Therefore, explanatory research is clearly the most suitable for this particular 
thesis.  
An inner layer of the research “onion” are the different research strategies. The 
research strategy of the research falls under the experiment strategy. The purpose of 
the experiment strategy is to study causal links among variables. In other words, the 
experimental strategy helps to determine whether a change in the independent 
variable causes a change in the dependent variable (Saunders et al. 2009, 142). The 
experiment strategy suits this thesis since this research examines whether the 
independent variables (tangibility, R&D expenditure, market value and the presence 
of financial experts on boards of directors) causes a change on the dependent 
variables (short- and long-term debt).  
3.2 Data collection 
According to Ghauri, & Grønhaug (2002, 76), secondary data is data that was origi-
nally gathered for different objectives than the current research. At times, the sec-
ondary data provides sufficient information to reach the research objectives, hence, 
primary data, whose retrieval might be costly and time-consuming, might not be nec-
essary (ibid. 78).  
Nevertheless, when collecting secondary data, a researcher needs to keep in mind 
that the data was originally gathered for other purposes, and the information found 
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might not completely suit the existing research problem. Therefore, it has to be care-
fully analyzed for the relevance of the research problem. (ibid. 78-79). 
For the purpose of this study, only secondary data was collected. The advantages of 
secondary data are that it provides a large amount of data over long periods with 
high precision, especially when quantitative data is being used. (Adams, 2014, 105). 
For this research the OMXH25 was chosen. These 25 firms have the largest market 
value in Finland. Due to the different relationships financial firms have towards debt, 
they consider it as the regular operating system instead of considering it as a liability. 
It was decided to exclude the two financial firms from this research, and to conduct 
the analysis on the reminder 23 firms. The market value of the 23 firms are as fol-
lows: 8 are large-cap, 13 are mid-cap and 2 are small-cap. Information on 23 stocks 
included in this thesis can be found from appendix 1. 
The financial information was collected from Nasdaq Nordic as well as from two 
stock market databases, Yahoo Finance and Euroland.com. The data obtained pro-
vided the historical stock prices at the end of years 2013-2016. Financial information 
such as tangible and intangible assets, current and non-current debt and operating 
profit were obtained from the chosen firms’ 2013-2016 annual reports. The infor-
mation regarding the education level and the work experience in the field of finance 
of the directors was collected from Bloomberg, as well as the firms’ own corporate 
governance section.  
After all the data was obtained, it was extracted into the form of Microsoft Excel 
spreadsheets. The data was then processed in SPSS and used for calculations that will 
be described in 3.4. Alongside the financial figures, journals, online articles and publi-
cations, websites and textbooks were the sources for the theoretical background and 
literature review chapter. 
Telia Company’s annual report figures are given in Swedish Krona. For this research, 
the currency was converted into euros with the conversion rate of 1 EUR = 9.84 SEK 
as of 22/01/2018. 
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3.3 Definition of key variables  
In this subchapter, the key variables are defined and explained in order to provide a 
better understanding of the research. 
Short-term debt (STD) represents any financial obligations that are due within one 
year. Short-term debt presented in a firm’s balance sheet under “Current liabilities” 
(Nasdaq, 2017a). 
Long-term debt (LTD) consists of loans and financial obligations that are to be ma-
tured in a greater than one year period. Long-term debt presented in a firm’s balance 
sheet under “non-current liabilities” (Nasdaq, 2017b). 
Total debt (TD) is the sum of short-term debt and long-term debt. 
Board size (BS) is the amount of board members on the board of directors.  
Average education (AvgEdu) is the average education per board which is measured 
according to: Bachelor’s degree = 1 point, Master’s degree = 2 points and Ph.D. = 3 
points. Exclusively in the field of business. 
Average experience (AvgExp) is the average years of experience per board. Exclu-
sively in the field of finance.  
Market capitalization (MarCap) is the total market value a firm is worth. It is calcu-
lated by multiplying the number of its outstanding shares by the current market price 
of a firm’s shares (Nasdaq, 2017c). 
Tangible assets (TanAssets) are any assets that have a physical form with clear pur-
chase value (Oxford Reference 2018c). 
Intangible assets (InTanAssets) are assets that can neither be seen nor touched, they 
vary among goodwill, intellectual property, copyrights, trademarks, patents, etc. (Ox-
ford Reference, 2018d). 
Tangible to intangible assets (TanToInTan) is the ratio between the amounts of tan-
gible assets to intangible assets. 
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Return on assets (ROA) is an accounting ratio describing the amount of operating 
profit for a given year as a percentage of the assets of a firm (Oxford Reference, 
2018e).  
3.4 Data analysis 
This paper includes several analyses. To each of these analyses, dependent, and inde-
pendent variables were assigned. In this research there are three dependent varia-
bles: short-term debt (STD), long-term debt (LTD) and total debt (TD). In addition, 
there are eight independent variables: board size (BS), average education (AvgEdu), 
average experience (AvgExp), market capitalization (MarCap), tangible assets (TanAs-
set), intangible assets (InTanAsset), tangible to intangible assets (TanToInTan) and re-
turn on assets (ROA). 
In this research, descriptive, correlation and regression analyses were performed 
with the help of SPSS statistics software in order to determine the relationships 
among the variables. The descriptive statistics provide the reader with a numerical 
overview of the research data set. This data set indicates the information concerning 
the number of observations, maximum value, minimum value, mean and standard 
deviation of the examined variables. In this case there are 92 observations during the 
years 2013-2016. Minimum and maximum stand for the extreme values of the varia-
bles, mean value stands for the arithmetic average, and lastly, standard deviation 
stands for the variance from its mean, and is a measure of the dispersion (Goos, & 
Meintrup, 2015, 68-69). 
In addition to descriptive analysis, inferential analysis is as well presented in this pa-
per. Inferential analysis is composed of correlation and regression analysis. The cor-
relation analysis measures the relationship between two or more variables. The de-
gree of the correlation may also be called correlation coefficient. For this study, it 
was decided to use the Pearson’s product-moment coefficient for measuring the cor-
relation coefficient. This measurement estimates the extent of linear regression be-
tween two variables. The range of Pearson’s product-moment coefficient varies from 
-1 to +1, describing whether there is a positive relationship between the two varia-
bles, negative relationship between the two variables, or whether the two variables 
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does not correlate with one another. A value of +1 represents a total positive linear 
correlation, a value of 0 represents no linear correlation, and a value of -1 represents 
a total negative linear correlation (Lane, 2018). After all the collected data was im-
ported into SPSS software, and “Bivariate analysis” was selected, the outcome given 
were the values of the correlation coefficients as presented in table 3.  
The final analysis employed in this study is the multiple regression analysis. This anal-
ysis helps estimating the interrelation between a dependent variable to several inde-
pendent variables (Montgomery et al. 2012, 1). The usage of the multiple regression 
analysis enables researchers to include various independent variables resulting in a 
clearer and more flexible outcome. The multiple regression model is acknowledged 
as a very practical procedure to enable the researcher to distinguish between the ef-
fects of the specific independent variables. Thus, the variables adjust to each other’s 
effects and eliminate the unexpected effects (Dougerty, 2011, 152-155, Westhoff, 
2013, 154-155). 
The regression analysis measures several aspects. This study uses the test of signifi-
cance in order to examine whether it is possible or not to reject the null hypothesis. 
Failing to reject implies that there is no linear relationship between the variables 
(Montgomery et al. 2012, 24). The significance denotes the risk of being a type 1 er-
ror when failing to reject the null hypothesis according to the following significance 
levels: 1%, 5% and 10%. These values correspond to the probability of observing an 
extreme value by chance (Statistics Yale, 2018, Mohr, 1990, 11-12). This paper con-
tains both 1%, 5% and 10% as significance levels that reject the null hypothesis. 
The multiple regression analysis examines, in addition to the test of significance, also 
the r-squared and the Durbin-Watson. The r-squared helps capturing the best fitted 
regression model. The values of r-squared range between 0-1 when higher values of 
r-squared indicate a better fit (Westhoff, 2013, 490). 
When regression analysis is made, measurement errors and selection bias often oc-
cur (Schroeder et al. 1986, 8). The primary assumption of this model is that even 
though some errors are positive and others are negative and they may vary in size, 
the mean of the errors should be zero. If the mean is not zero, the data suffers from 
28 
 
 
autocorrelation, which refers to the case in which the residual errors terms from dif-
ferent observations are correlated (ibid.). The Durbin-Watson test tests whether any 
autocorrelations exists (Schroeder et al. 1986, 10). The values of Durbin-Watson 
range between 0-4, a value near to 0 indicates positive autocorrelation, a value near 
to 2 indicates non-autocorrelation, and a value near to 4 indicates negative autocor-
relation (Brooks, 2008, 150). 
3.5 Reliability and validity 
Saunders et al. (2009, 156) define reliability as the extent to which data collection 
methods or analysis techniques provide consistent results for a similar data set. This 
can be evaluated by considering the whether a similar type of research will lead to 
identical results. Concerning this particular research, the findings are reliable be-
cause the methods employed in this research have been utilized by numerous re-
searchers in a similar manner. Moreover, similar results could also be found by re-
placing the used variables with alternate ones. Another point to note is that the data 
was collected from reliable sources such as firms’ own annual, and corporate govern-
ance reports. Also the chosen firms represent numerous industries with up to date 
data since all the data used in this research is during the years 2013-2016. Further-
more, the data collection methods and the analysis technique employed in this re-
search were well explained in order to make it understandable for any reader. 
Saunders et al. (2009, 157) define validity as the level of how well the findings repre-
sent what they were intended to. Validity may be classified into two types – external 
and internal validity (ibid.). External validity is the extent to which the results of a 
study can be generalized to a wider sample. To support the external validity in this 
research, a suitable sampling approach was applied when choosing the companies 
used in the analysis. A total of 23 top-tier Finnish firms formed a sum of 92 observa-
tions. The chosen 23 firms vary across industries, which helps avoiding the results of 
being generalized to a particular industry. To support the internal validity and to 
avoid common statistics flaws of the research results, the data for this study was 
carefully selected. The data was collected from published annual and corporate gov-
ernance reports, as well as from Bloomberg and Reuters. Using such data demon-
strates the credibility and trustworthiness of the study. Furthermore, since all the 
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firms are Finnish, they all follow similar rules and regulations which diminishes the 
likelihood for statistical flaws. Also, the determinants of debt that were hypothesized 
to influence the amount of short- and long-term leverage produced findings that 
were corresponding to the results expected, hence this research paper should be 
considered valid.  
4 Research Results 
This chapter presents the research results. First, the descriptive statistics are ana-
lyzed, followed by correlation analysis, and finally the regression analysis for both 
long-term debt, short-term debt and total debt. 
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
The mean of long-term debt is 1.38 billion euros, and the mean of short-term debt is 
360 million euros, totaling debt mean with 1.74 billion euros. The mean market capi-
talization is 6.55 billion euros, with tangible assets of 2.56 billion euros and 0.99 bil-
lion of intangible assets. This data set implies that top-tier Finnish firms that own 
substantial amount of market capitalization and tangible assets, issue considerably 
much more long-term debt than short-term debt. Furthermore, the data set certifies 
clearly that most firms own abundant tangible assets in relation to their intangible 
assets, which makes the claim that intangible assets support debt irrelevant, as it is 
widely known that tangible assets supports debt better than intangible assets. 
The minimum of return on assets is negative, meaning that at least one firm com-
pleted a calendar year with less returns than its total assets. However, the mean of 
return on assets is 9.4%, meaning that in average, firms have more returns than their 
total assets. Both short-term debt and long-term debt have relatively high standard 
deviation. These results indicate that short-term debt and long-term debt figures 
were significantly different from one another. Such results may be explained by the 
fact that the chosen firms involved in this analysis are heterogeneous. These firms 
are significantly diversified because the OMXH25 is composed of small, mid and large 
cap firms. Moreover, the standard deviation of market capitalization is relatively 
high. This indicates again how significantly different figures across firms are. Such 
30 
 
 
high standard deviation for market capitalization may explain the reason why the 
minimum and maximum of long-term debt, short-term debt and total debt vary so 
much. 
Table 2 - Descriptive Statistics 
  N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
LTD 92 16,000,000 9,313,600,000 1,388,995,569 2,105,404,575,431 
STD 92 600,000 3,376,000,000 360,106,066 498,989,566,135 
TD 92 67,000,000 10,315,752,033 1,748,891,528 2,471,985,694,963 
BS 92 5 12 8.065 1.451 
MarCap 92 543,244,011 38,510,871,378 6,557,245,739 8,137,736,646 
TanAsset 92 82,200,000 13,113,000,000 2,568,244,802 2,831,184,587 
InTanAsset 92 18,000,000 10,960,000,000 990,011,024 1,911,197,915 
ROA 92  -,058   ,539  ,0941   ,0979  
 
4.2 Correlation analysis 
Table 3 presents the level of correlation between the following variables: long-term 
debt, board size, average education, average experience, market capitalization, tan-
gible assets, intangible assets, tangible to intangible assets ratio, and return on as-
sets. The range of the correlation analysis varies between -1 to +1. When the figure is 
closer to -1, it expresses strong negative correlation, when the figure is closer to 0, it 
expresses very weak correlation, and when the figure is closer to +1, it expresses 
strong positive correlation. The denotations of * and ** represent 0.1 < p < 0.5, and 
0.5 < p levels of correlations respectively. 
Long-term debt is strongly correlated with board size (0.569), market capitalization 
(0.568) and tangible and intangible assets (0.768 and 0.661 respectively). On the 
other hand, long-term debt is weakly negatively correlated with average education (-
0.168) and return on assets (-0.163). This data set implies that long-term debt is de-
pendent of many aspects, and if a firm lacks only one of the strongly correlated de-
terminants, it may not affect long-term debt significantly. Moreover, board size is 
correlated with market capitalization (0.438), tangible and intangible assets (0.299 
and 0.587 respectively), and negatively correlated with tangible to intangible assets 
ratio. This data set confirms the relationship between bigger boards of directors with 
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higher market capitalization. Lastly, market capitalization is correlated with both tan-
gible and intangible assets (0.371 and 0.623 respectively). These results support the 
argument that wealthier firms own large amounts of tangible and intangible assets. 
Table 3 - Correlation Coefficient 
 LTD BS AvgEdu AvgExp MarCap 
Tan 
Asset 
InTan 
Asset 
TanTo 
InTan 
ROA 
LTD 1,000 ,569 -,168 -,041 ,568 ,786 ,661 ,029 -,163 
BS ,569 1,000 -,051 -,159 ,438 ,299 ,587 -,356 -,047 
AvgEdu -,168 -,051 1,000 -,166 -,067 -,050 -,038 -,190 ,072 
AvgExp -,041 -,159 -,166 1,000 -,053 ,125 -,173 ,157 -,015 
MarCap ,568 ,438 -,067 -,053 1,000 ,371 ,623 -,131 -,041 
TanAsset ,786 ,299 -,050 ,125 ,371 1,000 ,245 ,291 -,203 
InTanAsset ,661 ,587 -,038 -,173 ,623 ,245 1,000 -,247 -,118 
TanToInTan ,029 -,356 -,190 ,157 -,131 ,291 -,247 1,000 -,119 
ROA -,163 -,047 ,072 -,015 -,041 -,203 -,118 -,119 1,000 
Note: * 0.1 < p < 0. 5; ** p > 0. 5 
Number of observations N = 92. 
 
4.3 Regression analysis - Long-term debt 
In tables 4-6, the regression analysis is presented for long-term debt, short-term debt 
and total debt respectively. The denotations of *, ** or *** represent the 10%, 5% 
and 1% significance levels respectively. The figures in these tables for each interrela-
tion are based on its significance level. The lower the figure, the higher the likelihood 
the results have not occurred by chance. In other words, if the figure is under 10%, it 
is considered significant. Furthermore, if r-squared is closer to 1, the better the re-
gression line fits the data, and if Durbin-Watson value is near 2, it indicates no auto-
correlation. 
Table 4 presents the effect of the independent variables on long-term debt. This 
analysis clearly indicates that tangible and intangible assets, average education, 
board size and the tangible to intangible assets ratio are strongly associated with 
long-term debt. On the other hand, return on assets that falls just below the signifi-
cance level, as well as, Market capitalization and average experience are insignificant 
in relation to long-term debt. 
32 
 
 
The r-squared in this regression model lays on .906. Such a high r-squared suggests 
that this model fits very well with the data. The Durbin Watson test was 1.851. A fig-
ure that close to 2 suggests that the data did not suffer from any autocorrelation. 
Table 4 - Regression analysis – Long-term debt  
Dependent variables Significance 
(Constant) ,000*** 
Tangible Assets ,000*** 
Intangible Assets ,000*** 
Average Education ,000*** 
Board Size ,000*** 
Tangible To Intangible Assets ,040** 
Return On Assets ,153 
Market Capitalization ,701 
Average Experience ,835 
R Squared ,906 
Durbin-Watson 1,851 
Note: *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * 0.05 < p < 0. 1 
4.4 Regression analysis - Short-term debt 
Table 5 presents the effect of the independent variables on short-term debt. Unlike 
long-term debt, short-term debt is strongly associated only with tangible assets and 
market capitalization. Return on assets, which also in this table is just over 10%, dif-
ferently from table 4, is considered associated with short-term debt, and will be ob-
served along with tangible assets and market capitalization. According to this model, 
short-term debt has numerous insignificant independent variables. Average educa-
tion, intangible assets, tangible to intangible assets ratio, board size and average ex-
perience are not associated with short-term debt. 
The r-squared in this regression model lays on .439. An r-squared value of .439 sug-
gests that this model fits moderately well with the data. The Durbin Watson test was 
2.012. A figure that close to 2 suggests that the data did not suffer from any autocor-
relation. 
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Table 5 - Regression analysis – Short-term debt 
Dependent variables Significance 
(Constant) ,674 
Tangible Assets ,000*** 
Intangible Assets ,005*** 
Average Education ,126* 
Board Size ,307 
Tangible To Intangible Assets ,509 
Return On Assets ,547 
Market Capitalization ,707 
Average Experience ,829 
R Squared ,439 
Durbin-Watson 2,012 
Note: *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * 0.05 < p < 0. 1 
4.5 Regression analysis - Total debt 
Table 6 presents the effect of the independent variables on total debt. Total debt 
consists of both long-term and short-term debt, therefore, this model indicates 
which independent variables are associated with the combination of the two. This 
analysis clearly indicates that tangible and intangible assets, average education and 
board size are strongly associated with total debt. As previously mentioned, these 
four independent variables are also strongly associated with long-term debt. Due to 
the significant role long-term debt has on total debt, we may learn why long-term 
debt and total debt share similar determinants. On the other hand, the tangible to 
intangible assets ratio, which was also significant to long-term debt is insignificant to 
total debt. Moreover, market capitalization and return on assets which are significant 
to short-term debt, are insignificant to total debt.  
The r-squared in this regression model lays on .846. Such a high r-squared suggests 
that this model fits with the data very well. The Durbin Watson test was 1.916. A fig-
ure that close to 2 suggests that the data did not suffer from any autocorrelation. 
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Table 6 - Regression analysis – Total debt 
Dependent variables Significance 
(Constant) ,091 
Tangible Assets ,000*** 
Intangible Assets ,000*** 
Average Education ,007*** 
Board Size ,091* 
Tangible To Intangible Assets ,202 
Return On Assets ,255 
Market Capitalization ,360 
Average Experience ,748 
R Squared ,846 
Durbin-Watson 1,916 
Note: *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * 0.05 < p < 0. 1 
 
5 Discussion and Conclusions 
This chapter summarizes the results of the analysis performed in order to answer the 
research questions and compare them with the predefined hypotheses. In Addition, 
this chapter also explains the practical implications and limitations of the study along 
with recommendations for future research.   
5.1 Summary of the key findings 
The main goal of this research was to determine whether tangible assets, R&D ex-
penditure, market value and the presence of financial experts on boards of directors 
impact firms’ debt. This was done by looking for relationships between the depend-
ent variables and the independent variables. To conclude the key findings of the re-
search, the research questions are individually answered, and the hypotheses are ac-
cepted or rejected.  
1. Do the tangible assets impact firms’ debt (both, short- and long-term)?  
H1: Tangible assets do impact firms’ debt for both short- and long-term. 
The correlation coefficient of long-term debt together with tangible assets is 0.786, 
proving that there is a strong positive correlation between long-term debt and tangi-
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ble assets. To further support that both long- and short-term debt and tangible as-
sets are positively correlated, the regression analysis generated a level of significance 
that individually measures tangible assets with long-term debt, short-term debt and 
total debt. The results were 0%, 0%, 0% respectively. As previously mentioned, if the 
level of significance is 0%, it is proven that the alternative hypothesis can be rejected, 
and therefore the variables are strongly positively associated. These results support 
prior studies that tangible assets support debt. Tangible assets may serve as collat-
eral and lenders feel more secure issuing debt to firms with ample tangible assets. 
Based on both correlation and regression analysis, it is proven that there is a strong 
positive correlation between both long- and short-term debt and tangible assets, 
and therefore the hypothesis is accepted. 
2. Does the R&D expenditure impact firms’ debt (both, short- and long-term)? 
H2: R&D expenditure does impact firms’ long-term debt but not the short-term debt. 
The correlation coefficient of long-term debt together with intangible assets is 0.661, 
proving that there is a strong positive correlation between long-term debt and intan-
gible assets. To further support that long-term debt and intangible assets are posi-
tively correlated, the level of significance of the two variables was 0%, proving that 
the alternative hypothesis can be rejected, and consider long-term debt and intangi-
ble assets strongly positively associated. On the other hand, short-term debt has a 
level of significance of 0.509. As previously mentioned, if the level of significance ex-
ceeds 10%, the alternative hypothesis cannot be rejected, and therefore it is impossi-
ble to certify that short-term debt and intangible assets are correlated. These results 
support prior studies that intangible assets support long-term debt because they 
support the repayment of debt and can potentially serve as collateral. Moreover, in-
tangible assets are non-current assets and they cannot generate income in short 
times, and therefore they do not support short-term debt. 
Based on both correlation and regression analysis, it is proven that there is a strong 
positive correlation between long-term debt and intangible assets. Moreover, this 
research cannot prove a correlation between short-term debt and intangible 
assets. Therefore, the hypothesis is accepted.  
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3. Does the market value impact firms’ debt (both, short- and long-term)? 
H3: Market value does impact firms’ debt for both short- and long-term. 
The correlation coefficient of long-term debt together with market capitalization is 
0.568, proving that there is a strong positive correlation between long-term debt and 
market capitalization. However, the regression analysis generated a figure of 0.701 
level of significance. Because this research analyzed a sum of 92 observations, which 
is a very large sample size, it is safe to rely only on the correlation coefficient rate, 
and claim that long-term debt is positively correlated with market capitalization. In 
addition to long-term debt, short-term debt has a level of significance of 0.005. Level 
of significance at that rate proves that the alternative hypothesis can be rejected, 
and therefore the variables are strongly positively associated. These results support 
prior studies that wealthier firms issue more debt. Wealthier firms often own more 
tangible assets that may serve as collateral to reduce the risk from lenders. Further-
more, for a wealthier firm the likelihood to get bankrupt is drastically lower than less 
wealthier firms because countries often assist firms with bailouts (for example, Gen-
eral electric, and JP Morgan Chase after the 2008 financial crisis). Another reason 
why wealthier firms tend to issue more debt may be because lenders seek for safer 
borrowers even with less favorable debt conditions.  
Based on both correlation and regression analysis, it is proven that there is a strong 
positive correlation between long- and short-term debt with market value, and 
therefore the hypothesis is accepted. 
4. Does the presence of financial experts on the boards of directors influence the 
procurement of debt favorably?  
H4: The presence of financial experts on the boards of directors does influence the 
procurement of debt favourably. 
The correlation coefficient of long-term debt together with average experience is 
negative 0.041, proving that there is no correlation between long-term debt and av-
erage experience. To further support that both long- and short-term debt and aver-
age experience are not correlated, the regression analysis generated a level of signifi-
cance that individually measures average experience with long-term debt, short-term 
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debt, and total debt. The results were 0.835, 0.829, and 0.255 respectively. As previ-
ously mentioned, if the level of significance exceeds 10%, the alternative hypothesis 
cannot be rejected, and therefore it is impossible to certify that the variables are 
positively associated. The results given are very surprising because they oppose prior 
studies. It is expected by the financial experts to be willing to issue more debt due to 
their experience in the field, and their knowledge of tax benefits. However, most di-
rectors have gone a long way in top positions prior to being directors, and have 
gained long experience concerning issuing debt, which might explain why there is no 
correlation between debt and the presence of financial experts on the boards of di-
rectors. 
Based on both correlation and regression analysis, it is proven that there is no 
correlation between long- and short-term debt and the presence of financial 
experts on the boards of directors, and therefore the hypothesis is rejected. 
In addition to the main hypotheses, 2 other hypotheses were developed and are 
tested individually:  
H5: Board size positively correlates to market value. 
The correlation coefficient of board size together with market capitalization is 0.438, 
proving that there is a fairly strong positive correlation between board size and mar-
ket capitalization. This result may explain that wealthier firms tend to assign more di-
rectors to their boards, and that wealthier firms are often more complex and there-
fore in need for bigger boards.  
Based on correlation analysis, it is proven that there is a fairly strong positive 
correlation between the board size and market capitalization, and therefore the 
hypothesis is accepted. 
H6: Total debt positively correlates to tangible to intangible assets. 
The regression analysis of total debt with tangible to intangible assets ratio is 0.202. 
When the level of significance rate exceeds 10%, it does not consider significant. The 
result is that the alternative hypothesis cannot be rejected, and therefore total debt 
and tangible to intangible assets ratio cannot be not considered correlated. This 
result is different than expected. As tangible assets are well known for impacting 
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debt, and intangible assets are not well known for impacting short-term debt, the 
assumption was that total debt should be positively associated with tangible to 
intangible assets ratio. This result may be explained by the decision of choosing top-
tier Finnish firms, with ample tangible and intangible assets, up to a point that their 
ratio does not affect total debt. 
Based on regression analysis, it is proven that there is no correlation between total 
debt and tangible to intangible assets ratio, and therefore the hypothesis is 
rejected. 
5.2 Practical implications 
Capital structure has been one of the major research topics in recent years. Organiza-
tions and researchers have tried for years to find an optimal capital structure by con-
ducting numerous papers about this topic. There have been mixed results on the evi-
dence of the factors influencing the capital structure of a firm. This particular re-
search contributes to an already extensive literature that exists on capital structure. 
However, the results are particularly important concerning top-tier Finnish firms. 
The results of this research are particularly useful for corporations. By acknowledging 
these results, firms might be able to compose a more suitable capital structure. Also, 
corporations might learn from this research to take advantages of being in their posi-
tion. Firms might issue more debt in favoring conditions due to having large sums of 
tangible assets, and or by having high market value. 
Furthermore, the results of this paper could be of interest for majority shareholders. 
As many studies proved the importance of a well-functioning boards of directors, this 
research has several new points of view concerning the composition of the boards. 
The main finding is that financial experts with many years of experience behind them 
do not affect how levered a firm is. In other words, shareholders should not neces-
sarily seek for financial experts over experts in other fields of expertise. Another 
point of view that can be taken from this paper is that wealthier firms tend to have 
bigger boards. That fact might be related to the reason that wealthier firms are often 
more complex and are composed of more departments than smaller firms usually 
are. 
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Lastly, the outcome of this research may be of interest to researchers in the field of 
finance in particular and business in general. This paper provides additional findings 
that are of importance to reach more accurate predictions on the determinants of 
short- and long-term debt.   
5.3 Limitations and recommendations 
There are several limitations to this research, mainly due to lack of time, money, and 
other resources. Firstly, the sample of this research incorporated 23 firms. Overall, 
the research covers a very large range of industries, however, when only one firm 
represents a whole industry, it undermines the reliability of this particular industry’s 
results (see appendix 1). Also, the likelihood of one well represented industry to en-
joy a bull period or suffer from a bust period and critically tilt the averages is possi-
ble.  
Secondly, measuring leverage cannot be observed similarly among firms. Some firms 
seek for expansion and might need additional funds, while some firms might have 
sufficient funds without having to issue new debt. Furthermore, some firms might be 
satisfied with their current operations, while others constantly be looking for expan-
sions, which may require additional debt. Also, different firms and individuals experi-
ence different relationships towards debt, which might explain why firms’ capital 
structure varies so much. 
Thirdly, there is the need to be aware of the possibility of p-hacking. This means that 
when collecting a large number of random variables and checking for correlations, 
there is a statistical probability that strong correlations will be found simply because 
many pairs have been tested. 
Lastly, the sample taken for this research represents a very small proportion of the 
actual total population, and may not be big enough to show completely accurate re-
sults, which can be generalized.  
However, regardless of the aforementioned limitations, this research provided statis-
tically significant results that can be tested with similar sample and verified by using 
other methods, keeping the basic assumptions constant.  
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The recommendations for future research resulting from the limitations are as 
follows. Firstly, as previously mentioned, although there is a total of 92 observations, 
there are only 23 different capital structure approaches. Perhaps next research could 
be made with 92 firms over a life span of one year. 
Secondly, supporting studies could be made by using the data prior to the 2008 fi-
nancial crisis. It might add to the whole picture of capital structure as of pre-financial 
and post-financial crisis. Lastly, this research focused on four determinants of lever-
age (tangibility, R&D expenditure, market value and the presence of financial experts 
on the boards of directors). A supporting research might incorporate more determi-
nants of leverage such as insolvency costs, level of growth, firms with more volatile 
earnings and profitability. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1. Information of the 23 selected stocks. 
Company name Stock code Industry Cap size 
Amer Sports Oyj AMEAS Consumer Goods Mid cap 
Cargotec Oyj CGCBV Industrials Mid cap 
Elisa Oyj ELISA Telecommunications Mid cap 
Fortum Oyj FORTUM Utilities Large cap 
Huhtamäki Oyj HUH1V Industrials Mid cap 
Konecranes Oyj KCR Industrials Mid cap 
Kesko Oyj B KESKOB Consumer Services Mid cap 
Kone Oyj KNEBV Industrials Large cap 
Metsä Board Oyj B METSB Basic Materials Mid cap 
Metso Oyj METSO Industrials Mid cap 
Neste Oyj NESTE Oil & Gas Large cap 
Nokia Oyj NOKIA Technology Large cap 
Nokian Renkaat Oyj NRE1V Consumer Goods Mid cap 
Orion Oyj B ORNBV Health Care Mid cap 
Outotec Oyj OTE1V Industrials Small cap 
Outokumpu Oyj OUT1V Basic Materials Mid cap 
Stora Enso Oyj R STERV Basic Materials Mid cap 
Telia Company TELIA1 Telecommunications Large cap 
Tieto Oyj TIE1V Technology Small cap 
UPM Kymmene Oyj UPM1V Basic Materials Large cap 
Valmet VALMT Industrials Mid cap 
Wärtsilä Oyj abp WRT1V Industrials Large cap 
YIT Oyj YIT Industrials Small cap 
 
